TTP Resurgence amid Afghanistan’s Changing Security Environment

 Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan; in fact, it has been challenging the country’s security for more than three decades. Among others, religious motivation is the key root of terrorism in the country. Pakistan ranks 2nd among countries affected by terrorism. Global terrorism index 2025 recorded a 45 % percent increase in terrorism-related deaths. As the country is already facing severe economic and political crises, along with the persistent security challenges from Afghanistan and India, the rapid increase in terrorism is taking the country away from development.

Demographically, KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), with a population of 41 million, is the most affected area. The mountainous terrain of KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) shares an almost 1,172 km long border with Afghanistan.  This border-sharing for the KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) appeared as the curse of geography.

Moreover, after the 9/11 incident, the dynamic of the region changed entirely. Afghanistan was accused of the 9/11 incident, and eventually, the US and NATO forces entered Afghanistan. Similar mountainous terrains are globally used for tourism, and these are symbols of peace, while a similar terrain is used here by different terrorist groups. For instance, those militant and radicalized people who fought against the USSR were ready to fight with the US and NATO Forces. The border area of Pakistan and the autonomous region of ex-FATA have porous terrain, which allows easy entry into Pakistan. Moreover, this area had been previously used against the USSR  and later in  WOT during the US’s invasion of Afghanistan. Therefore, the US government put enormous pressure on the Pakistani government to control the region’s interference. In 2003, Pakistani forces were deployed in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (ex-FATA), without a full assessment of the severe and long-term repercussions this intervention would have for Pakistan.

A tragic future for Pakistan in terms of terrorism escalated. In 2007 Within five years of operation in ex-FATA, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan emerged as the primary terrorism group in Pakistan. This Terrorist group aimed to impose strict Islamic law in Pakistan, and the people of the ex-FATA region had resentment over the Pakistani Army’s operation in the ex-FATA region. This terrorist group attacked an innocent group of students of APS (Army Public School) in 2014 and killed 134 students. This terrorist group gained global attention within a decade. Between 2008 and early 2009, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) exercised de facto control over select pockets of the Malakand Division and ex-FATA for several months. Moreover Pakistani government claims more than 80 thousand civilians have been killed due to terrorism in Pakistan.  UN reports claimed that in 2012 alone, TTP killed more than 2000 civilians in Pakistan.

 The persistent security of citizens and their responsibility was a major question. Based on evidence, it was found that both of the factors were responsible, i.e., precipitating and structural factors. Structural Factors: historically Ex-Fata region was relatively volatile and underdeveloped, two-thirds of the population lives below the poverty line, and this region has suffered the most in the entire country of Pakistan. Hence, structural factors are responsible for terrorism in the region, but blaming them only is half of the story.

While the precipitant factors include leadership, splinter groups, and foreign sponsorship have a major role. Leadership: leadership is known as the nucleus of an organization, which is intact, and the motivator of its people. Maulvi/Mufti Noor Wali Masud did the same; he reorganized the TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) and created shadow ministries in TTP, i.e., finances, information, etc. He started targeting officials over the civilians simultaneously. The reunification of factions such as Hizbul Ahrar and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar in 2019 increased the frequency of suicide attacks, including incidents like the Data Darbar attack and the Serena Hotel attack in Quetta.

Foreign Sponsorship also helped terrorist groups, for instance, the TTP got the safe havens in Afghanistan, both in terms of leadership and militants. In 2021, Afghanistan’s newly formed Afghan regime released thousands of militants, which also lead severe effects on the terrorists in Pakistan. Therefore the latter period of these terrorist groups is also called  resurgence of TTP. In 2020, UN reports recorded nearly 100 attacks between July and October. While ideologically, Afghanistan promotes the victor’s narrative, which provides the source of motivation for the terrorist groups.

However, the Pakistan State’s narrative is clear about the Islamic state under the 1973 constitution that Pakistan is a constitutional Islamic country. Moreover, in 2018, more than  1,800 religious scholars declared the Fatwa, famously known as Phegham-e-Pakistan. It’s often described as a 22-point national narrative, such as only the state can declare war or Jehad. In Fact in Islam, suicide bombing self harm are strictly prohibited, and these are major sins.

These national and international factors demanded Pakistan to respond to these terrorist groups on a larger scale. In 2014, Pakistan launched the National Action Plan to dismantle these terrorist groups, cut there financial support, while on same time. Pakistan applied the clear, hold, Build and transfer strategy. In the initial stage, Pakistan took the first step, called “Clear” in the Operation Zarb-ul-Azm in 2014, the Pakistan Army killed 3,400 militants and destroyed their infrastructure.  Fragmented the TTP into splinter groups such as Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and IS-KP. Simultaneously, a few hundred militants fled into Afghanistan.

After the first step, Pakistan entered into the second phase called Hold. In 2017, the Pakistani Army relaunched Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad. There, they removed all the remaining militant sleeper cells and controlled the area from the militants. The Third and most important step was to build the affected areas, especially in ex-FATA and border regions. Build Strategy is a long-term strategy where we focus on women’s agency and the rule of law, and it is done via non-combat measures.

Non-combative measures such as madrassa regulation, educational reforms, and the creation of economic opportunities.  Madrasa regulation became a critical policy priority, as nearly 4.6 million students had previously been vulnerable to exploitation under the Appearance of jihad. Consequently, greater emphasis was placed on monitoring mechanisms and financial transparency. Equally important was the creation of sustainable economic opportunities, as economic security is fundamental to human survival. This principle is reflected in the saying attributed to the Prophet (PBUH): “Poverty nearly leads to disbelief.” In line with this understanding, both federal and provincial governments introduced social protection and youth-focused initiatives, including the Ehsaas Programme, the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), and the Kamyab Jawan Programme.

Author: Nabeel Imtiaz is currently an intern at the Institute of Regional Studies, affiliated with the Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism Studies Program.

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