Huriya Shakeel Qureshi 
Huriya Shakeel Qureshi 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is built upon three fundamental pillars. The first pillar, non-proliferation, requires states without nuclear weapons to refrain from developing or acquiring them. The second pillar, disarmament, obliges the recognized nuclear-weapon states to pursue negotiations aimed at reducing and ultimately eliminating their nuclear arsenals. The third pillar, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, promotes international cooperation in the peaceful application of nuclear technology for electricity generation, healthcare, agriculture, and scientific research. Despite these objectives, the treaty continues to face several political, technical, and strategic challenges that may undermine its long-term effectiveness.
Between 1965 and 1968, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), operating under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva, negotiated the NPT. The treaty was founded on the concept of the “Grand Bargain,”whereby nuclear-weapon states committed themselves to pursuing nuclear disarmament and sharing peaceful nuclear technology, while non-nuclear-weapon states agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons.
The history of nuclear non-proliferation dates back to the end of the Second World War, following the United States’ use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The NPT was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serving as the primary verification body. As of 2026, 191 states are parties to the treaty, making it one of the most widely accepted international security agreements. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are recognized as nuclear-weapon states under the treaty. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel have never joined the NPT, while North Korea, which acceded in 1985, withdrew in 2003 and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. South Sudan, which gained independence in 2011, remains the only UN member state that has not joined the treaty.
The treaty is reviewed every five years through Review Conferences, while in 1995, member states agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely, largely through the diplomatic efforts of Thomas Graham Jr. Article III establishes the safeguards and verification system administered by the IAEA to ensure that civilian nuclear materials are not diverted for military purposes. Article IV guarantees the peaceful use of nuclear energy, whereas Article VI commits all parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament. Under the treaty, only states that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon before 1 January 1967 are officially recognized as nuclear-weapon states. Article X permits withdrawal from the treaty with three months’ notice if extraordinary events jeopardize a state’s supreme national interests. An important precursor to the NPT was the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963, which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.
The NPT continues to face significant technical challenges, particularly regarding verification and compliance. Since 2010, the IAEA’s responsibilities have expanded considerably due to the growing number of nuclear facilities and increasing quantities of nuclear materials requiring safeguards. However, budgetary constraints, limited inspection resources, and the expansion of civilian nuclear programmes continue to place pressure on the Agency’s verification capabilities. The existence of dual-use nuclear technologies, which can serve both civilian and military purposes, further complicates monitoring efforts. Moreover, Article X’s withdrawal provision creates a legal loophole that may allow states to develop nuclear expertise while remaining treaty members before withdrawing. Strategic competition among major powers, particularly the United States, China, and Russia, has also weakened international cooperation on nuclear arms control. Persistent disputes over North Korea’s nuclear programme and Iran’s uranium enrichment activities have further challenged the effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime.
Several political challenges also continue to undermine the treaty. North Korea has continued to modernize its nuclear arsenal by developing advanced ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missile capabilities, and nuclear delivery systems despite years of diplomatic negotiations. Similarly, following the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Iran significantly expanded its uranium enrichment programme, increasing international concerns regarding nuclear proliferation.
In South Asia, both India and Pakistan continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems to strengthen strategic deterrence amid their long-standing regional rivalry. Rising nationalism and intensifying geopolitical competition have further weakened international cooperation, as demonstrated by strategic competition between the United States and China and continuing political tensions between South Korea and Japan. At the same time, growing frustration among many non-nuclear-weapon states has strengthened support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), reflecting dissatisfaction with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament and the humanitarian consequences associated with nuclear weapons. These developments have raised questions regarding the credibility and legitimacy of the NPT.
Recent statistics further highlight these concerns. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the world possessed approximately 12,187 nuclear warheads at the beginning of 2026, of which around 9,745 were available for potential military use. Approximately 4,012 warheads were deployed with operational forces, while 2,100–2,200 remained on high operational alert, primarily in the United States and Russia. SIPRI also notes that all nine nuclear-armed states continue to modernize and expand their nuclear capabilities, indicating a reversal of the post-Cold War trend of gradual nuclear reductions.
In my opinion, the NPT creates an unequal international nuclear order by distinguishing between recognized nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. While it successfully discourages horizontal proliferation, it has been less effective in preventing vertical proliferation, as the recognized nuclear powers continue to modernize and upgrade their nuclear arsenals. Although Article VI obliges all parties to pursue nuclear disarmament, progress has remained limited. This perceived imbalance contributes to mistrust among non-nuclear states and weakens confidence in the treaty’s long-term fairness and effectiveness.
In conclusion, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the foundation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and has played a vital role in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons while promoting the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Nevertheless, increasing geopolitical competition, unequal obligations among member states, modernization of nuclear arsenals, verification challenges, and the slow pace of disarmament continue to undermine its effectiveness. Unless greater political commitment, stronger verification mechanisms, and meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament are achieved, the NPT’s credibility and long-term viability will remain under increasing pressure, raising significant concerns for international peace and global security.
